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[Abstract] 
This paper provides evidence on an amended Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin model 
with parties by studying the effects of U.S. tariffs on the Democratic vote 
share. The effects are estimated with fixed effects and Two-Stage Least 
Squares based on data from the House of Representatives from the years 
1982 to 2000. Weighted trade policy proxy for each congressional district are 
constructed and shown to be significant. Overall, a 10% decrease of weighted 
tariffs leads to a 12% decrease in the Democratic vote share in the election to 
the House, ceteris paribus. Also, the predictions of the model for electoral 
outcome are consistent with today’s U.S. politics. 
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I. Introduction 
 After many rounds of trade negotiations raised by the GATT-WTO 
agreement, numerous countries have successfully reduced their tariff 
barriers. Tariffs have fallen over the last 20 years in the U.S. Figure 1 shows 
the decrease in the U.S. average tariff rates from 4.33% in 1982 to around 
1.36% in 2000. Coincidentally, the Democratic Party’s average vote share in 
the election to the House of Representatives has also dropped during these 
years.  For example, the average vote share of the Democratic Party in year 
1982 was 57.8%; it diminished to 54.7% in year 2000. This raises an 
interesting question: can trade policy affect the electoral outcome?1 More 
specifically, can the declining level of tariffs translate into a falling vote share 
for the Democratic Party? 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
The related theoretical models on the political economy of trade policy 
have two different kinds of setup. The first one is “the median voter” 
approach, theorized by Mayer (1984) and by Magee, Brock and Young (1989). 
According to Mayer, trade policy is determined by majority voting while 
political parties maximize their probability of winning the election by 
choosing trade policy platform. Similarly, Magee, Brock and Young (1989) 
                                                 
1Notice that the U.S. trade policy is determined by the House of Representatives and Senates, 
as stated in article 1, section 8 of the US Constitution “the Congress shall have the power ... to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations ...”   2
considered a political model of endogenous policy formation. Under their 
framework, two parties set their trade platforms and then interest groups 
contribute funds in order to increase the probability that their preferred 
party would be elected.  
The second approach is called “political support”. This approach theorizes 
that tariffs are granted in response to demands by special-interest groups, 
such as industries and unions. Government weighs the increased political 
support it captures from pursuing policies beneficial to a particular industry 
against the support it loses from firms and consumers (Hillman, 1989). 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) developed this idea and found the optimal 
tariff formation for the government. Models with political support approach 
explicitly present the relationship between campaign contribution and 
optimal tariff; yet they do so at the expense of ignoring political competition 
between parties in their models.  
The existing works provide no clear evidence to the question of whether or 
not trade policy affects vote pattern. Instead, many empirical papers merely 
analyze what determines congressional roll-call vote patterns on American 
trade policy.  These works include those of Baldwin (1985), Irwin (1996) and 
Beaulieu (2002). The Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941) implied that trade 
policy is independent of industry and depends only on the type of factor 
ownership. Based on this prediction, Baldwin (1985) published the pioneering 
work that examined the determinants of congressional vote patterns on trade   3
legislation for the Tokyo Round of GATT.  Shortly thereafter, Irwin (1996) 
investigated this issue using election data from early twentieth century 
English countries where trade policy was the primary election issue. Both 
papers suggested that greater labor union is likely to result in higher 
protection level.  
From the political science perspective, two findings are important to 
understand the vote pattern. First, labor union is a strong electoral base for 
the Democratic Party. Besides which, Democrats also maintain a strong 
influence on many groups such as black voters and metropolitan residents. 
Second, campaign contributions play an important role in the pattern of 
voters. For example, Snyder (1990) found evidence of a positive causality 
between a political candidate’s probability of winning and the amount of 
money he collects from campaign contributors. Levitt (1994), on the other 
hand, found that challenger spending is marginally more productive than 
incumbent spending. Baldwin and Magee (2002) found evidence that voting 
behavior on recent trade bills can be explained by campaign contributions 
from special-interest groups. Particularly, financial contribution from labor 
groups was associated with votes against free trade, while contributions from 
business groups were associated with votes against freer trade.  
However, whether or not American trade policy has any effect on 
congressional vote pattern still remains an empirical question. In reality, 
trade policy is an important issue for politicians. One good example is what   4
transpired during the 2004 Presidential Election. The debate of “freer trade” 
vs. “free trade” was one of the most important contents of the two parties’ 
platforms. 
In this paper, I have explored the impact of trade policy on vote outcome.2 
The empirical work of this paper was based on an amended Mayer-
Heckscher-Ohlin model with parties: Democrats and Republicans. The 
Democratic Party is assumed to be a protectionist party and has traditionally 
shown preference on higher tariffs. Campaign contributions are collected 
from informed voters. Such funding influences the vote of a group of 
uninformed voters. The Democratic Party maximizes its vote share in the 
election by choosing the trade policy platform. Accordingly, in the U.S., a 
more protectionist trade policy platform of Democrats implies more 
contributions to the Democratic candidates and, therefore, could lead to a 
larger vote share.  
The methodology I used in this paper was the fixed effects estimation 
given the data set consisting of a panel of each congressional district from the 
years 1982 to 2000.  The estimation findings suggested that a 10% decrease 
of tariffs led to a 12.0% decrease in the Democratic vote share in the election 
to the House.  
                                                 
2 I adopted the “median-voter” approach here because the “political support” model does not consider 
political competition between parties.   5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a discussion of the 
theoretical model; Section 3 is a presentation of the empirical specifications 
and estimation results; Section 4 shows the sensitivity analysis; and Section 
5 presents the conclusion. 
II. Theoretical Model 
In this section, I developed a model of political competition between 
Democrats and Republicans based on the Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin setting. 
Such a model allowed me to develop an empirical estimation for the effects of 
trade policy on vote pattern.  
Consider a two-by-two (2 goods and 2 factors) Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin 
model. A capital-abundant country produces a capital- intensive commodity 
( 1 y ) and a labor- intensive commodity ( 2 y ), using capital and labor.  
Two political parties, i.e., Democratic Party and Republican Party, compete 
for office via trade policy. The Democratic Party, a protectionist party, prefers 
freer trade. On the other hand, the Republican Party, a pro-trade party, 
prefers free trade. Based on these assumptions, I came up with the 
expression:
R D p p > .  
There also exist two types of voters: the informed and the uninformed. 
Informed voters prefer a particular party while uninformed voters do not. 
One example is that some voters may spend so much money on imported 
goods and therefore care much about the import tariff. Because of this, they   6
have the inclination to make campaign contributions to their preferred party, 
and get benefits from their preferred trade policy if their preferred party wins 
the election.3  
Informed voters share the same additively separable quasi-linear 
preferences and maximize their utilities, ( )
j j j y u y U 2 1 + = , subject to their 
budget constraints 
j j py y 2 1 + =
j E . With the Metzler paradox ruled out, the 
import tariff (τ ) is assumed to be a specific one,
w p t p + = , where p
wdenotes 
the world price; and the import tariff income (T ) is redistributed with a lump 
sum subsidy. Assuming that each voter has the same labor endowment (L) 
but different capital endowments (
j K ), voter j ’s indirect utility function can 
be expressed as: 
+ = ) ( ) ( p CS p v
j L p T K p r p w
j ) ( ) ( ) ( + ⋅ + ,  
where ) (p CS is the consumer surplus and L  is the aggregate labor 
endowment for the whole labor force. 
A voter would support the Democratic Party if and only if his/her indirect 
utility under a Democratic tariff platform is higher than that under a 
republican tariff platform, hence,  0 ) ( ) ( > −
R j D j p v p v . Otherwise, he/she 
                                                 
3Here one voter is assumed to make a contribution to a single party only according to the campaign-
contribution-specialization theorem introduced by Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), Furthermore, by 
applying the theories of Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001), in this paper, the primary objective of 
making contribution is to affect the election outcome while the secondary objective is to buy the policy.   7
would vote for the Republican Party. This implies the set of voters for the 
Democratic Party, D Ω , is:  
D Ω =
j K {) ] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [
R D R D p w p w p CS p CS − + −  
                            } 0
)] ( ) ( [
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Intuitively, informed voters are separated into two groups. The blue-collar 
workers vote for the Democratic Party while the white-collar workers vote for 
the Republican Party. 
Informed voters make campaign contributions in order to affect the 
electoral outcome. Conversely, uninformed voters do not, yet they cast their 
ballots after being exposed to the different advertisements of each party.4 The 
advertisement expenditure comes from the financial contributions of the 
informed voters.  
                                                 
4 Although the uninformed voters understood the advertisement is just a “dress,” they still like to be swayed 
due to the enthusiasm of “social participation.”   8
The fraction of informed voters and uninformed voters is presumed as ρ  
and ρ − 1 , where ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ ρ .5 Each party’s vote share includes both the informed 
and the uninformed supporters. Out of the total informed group, the portion 





R D p p K j j dK K f , where ) (
j K f is the corresponding probability density 
function for voter j . However, the behavior of the uninformed supporters is 
still a black-box because their utility functions are unknown. Following the 
opinions of Jacobson et. al, (1987), the vote share from the uninformed group 
is directly proportional to the advertisement expenditure share of both 
parties. Specifically, a functional form  ) (
R D D C C C +   is used to characterize 
the behavior of uninformed voters, where 
R D C C , denote the aggregate 
campaign contributions that the Democratic Party and the Republican Party 
could collect, respectively.  
The timing of this three-stage non-cooperative game is as follows: (1) 
informed voters have their own contributions schedules; (2) both parties 
announce their trade platforms; and (3) all voters vote.6 
                                                 
5 Here, I assumed this fraction is exogenous given, and then provide an estimated number in the empirical 
section. 
6 This framework is consistent with previous researches, such as those done by Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) and by Baron (1994).   9
The backward induction implied that the contribution schedule was a 
function of the trade platform for each party. In the sub-game perfect Nash 
Equilibrium, each party chooses its optimal platform that is feasible to be 
able to maximize its vote share. Assuming the vote share of the Democratic 
Party,
D π , is a concave function, it has the following form: 
D π  =  ()





0 R D R R D D
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⋅ − + ⋅∫ ρ ρ                (1). 
It should be noted that the informed voters for the Democratic Party are 
relatively skewed towards the labor groups. According to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem (1941), a rise in the import tariff would increase the 
relative wage for workers. Hence, the contribution schedule of the Democratic 
Party is an increasing function of tariff. That is, the marginal contribution 
schedule of the Democratic Party of its trade platform is positive: 
0 > ∂ ∂
D D p C .  
To consider the effect of the Democratic trade platform on its vote share, I 
took the partial derivative of the Democratic vote share with respect to its 
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.  As shown in Appendix A, the sign of this term   10
is ambiguous. Accordingly, the effect of trade platform on the Democratic vote 
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, it could be negative.  
 This makes sense intuitively. A rise in tariff brings more votes in favor of 
the protectionist party if the platform is less than its optimal level. However, 
when the party announces a very high tariff platform, it collects more money 
from the informed group and hence gets more votes from the uninformed 
group, yet at the expense of losing some informed voters because the former 
(i.e., those at the borderline) would be inclined to vote for another party.  
In a nutshell, the theoretical model clearly suggests that the Democratic 
vote share depends on tariffs and campaign contribution share. However, the 
effect of the Democratic trade platform on its vote share is still ambiguous, 
and hence, remains an empirical question.  
III.  Estimates 
In reality, it is impossible to estimate the effect of a Democratic trade 
platform on the congressional voting pattern since the trade platform is 
unobservable. Instead, what we can observe is the congressional trade policy. 
Hence, in this paper, the focus is on the effect of congressional trade policy on 
the Democratic vote share.    11
The endogenous protection model presented above is not being tested here 
for two reasons. First, my theoretical model is based on the Mayer-
Heckscher-Ohlin model, which is known to be a simplification if to be taken 
as literally correct and hence no alternative hypothesis is offered. Second, the 
theory above implies an ambiguous sign of the effect of trade platform given 
that the objective function, the Democratic vote share, is concave. Hence, the 
strategy I used here is to “estimate, but not test it” introduced by Learner-
Levinsohn (1995). In other words, the theoretical model is being used to 
motivate the endogenous relationship between the Democratic vote share and 
tariffs.  
A. Industrial Weighted Tariffs 
There is no doubt that each congressional district faces an identical 
national-line tariff for a commodity given a specific year. However, different 
states in the U.S. have different industrial structures. For example, Alaska 
has a higher weight in the agricultural sector while Massachusetts has a 
higher weight in the manufacturing sector. Even in the same state, different 
congressional districts may have quite different industrial structures. For 
example, the California bay area (congressional district 8) has a very large 
weight on electronic machinery while Imperial County (congressional district 
51) has a very large weight on forestry products instead. Hence, the effects of 
an identical national-line tariff on different congressional districts are quite 
different. In order to explore the effect of tariffs on vote pattern, I constructed   12
and calculated weighted tariffs at the congressional district level, using data 
on its industrial structure.  
The industrial weighted tariff at district i is defined as∑n n
i
n w τ , where 
i
n w is 
the industrial share of SIC 2-digit sector nrelative to its gross district 
product for all tradable sectors at the congressional districti, and  n τ is the 
SIC 2-digit tariff rate  in industry n. The SIC 2-digit tariffs are aggregated 
from the SIC 4-digit tariffs across countries and industries, which, in turn, 
are calculated using the duties value divided by the customs value. A more 
detailed description of tariffs manipulation can be found in Appendix B. 
Figure 2 presents the different industrial weighted tariffs in the 
congressional district 1 of Alaska, district 1 of Massachusetts, and districts 8 
and 51 of California.  All of these cases demonstrate tariffs decrease over 
time.    
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
B. Empirical Methodology 
To fully capture the effect of tariffs on Democratic vote share, it is 
appropriate to use a variable of measuring the difference in tariffs between 
two election years since the weighted tariffs are based on the industrial 
structure of each district. Consider a motivated example.  Weighted state-
level tariffs in year 2000 are lower than those in year 1982 for all 50 states. 
How does this change affect the Democratic vote share? A simple OLS   13
regression clearly suggests that the elasticity of the Democratic vote share 
with respect to weighted tariffs is significantly positive: 




s τ τ π π − ⋅ + − = − , 
 where 
D
s 2000 , π  and  2000 , s τ denote the  Democratic vote share and weighted 
tariffs in statesat year 2000. Figure 3 plots these period-change weighted 
tariffs and the Democratic vote shares for 50 states.  
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
My theoretical setup also suggests that campaign contribution is an 
important factor to the Democratic vote share. Hence, the empirical 
specification is:  




it Z x ε ϕ α θ τ β β β π + + + ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ + = ∆ 2 1 0                   (2). 
In this specification, the regressand is the change of the Democratic vote 
share (
D π ∆ ) in each congressional district i between two periodst and 1 + t . 
The regressors include the change of Democratic campaign contribution share 
(
D x ∆ ), the change of weighted tariffs ( τ ∆ ), and also other control variables 
(Z ). For example, 
D
i 1982 , π ∆  measures the change of the Democratic vote share 
at congressional district ibetween year 1982 and year 1984. Treating the 
factors unconsidered as random variable, the error term is decomposed into 
three components: (1) congressional district fixed effects i α ; (2) time fixed   14
effects t ϕ ; and (3) a random component  it ε  with constant variance: 
) , 0 ( ~
2
i it N σ ε . 
Besides the trade policy, many other social factors could affect the 
Democratic vote share, such as sub-urbanization and immigration. The 
Democratic Party has a strong electoral base from the metropolitan residents, 
African-American, and immigrants who came from some specific countries. 
One good example is those who migrated from Ireland. Over the past 200 
years, almost all the Irish immigrants would vote in favor of the Democrats 
to reward the generosity that their first-American-generation ancestors 
received from the Democrats.   
Equally important is the analysis of how other public policies could affect 
the vote outcome. Traditionally, the Republican Party (e.g. Reagan 
Administration) favors anti-labor macroeconomic policies, such as high 
unemployment and low inflation. Conversely, the Democratic Party (e.g., 
Franklin Roosevelt, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Clinton Administrations) 
generates labor-friendly policies, such as low unemployment and high 
inflation. Furthermore, the strong organizational ability of the Republican 
Party could also explain the diminishing Democratic vote share over these 
years. 
To control these factors, the socio-economic variables (Z) are included. 
Particularly, the rural ratio, the black race ratio, and the foreign born ratio in 
each district were used in my estimations. In addition, the inflation rate at   15
national level was also included. However, it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure the organizational ability of the Democratic Party and 
hence it was omitted in my estimations. In other words, the omitted variables 
issue could lead to the endogeneity problem for my empirical specification. 
This endogeneity problem may also come from the issue of measurement 
error. After the 1994 Uruguay round, the U.S. tariffs were cut to 1/3 due to 
international trade agreements. This forced the U.S. to protect its products 
implicitly, using various non-tariff-barriers (henceforth referred to as NTB). 
Hence, the estimations could have a measurement error if using tariffs only 
to represent trade policy. To avoid this potential deficiency, two remedies 
were used here. First, I performed the Two-Stage Least Squares (henceforth 
referred to as 2SLS) to mitigate the endogeneity problem. Second, I used data 
on NTB to replace tariffs, serving as robustness check.  
C. Endogeneity and Instruments 
In order to mitigate the endogeneity issue in my model, good instruments of 
trade policy in the 2SLS estimate need to be addressed.  
Trade protection will be progressive in aiding the disadvantaged special-
interest-groups, especially when unemployment is high in the economy 
(Magee, Brock and Young, 1989; Trefler, 1993). Dutt and Mitra (2002) also 
found evidence that an increase in equality raises trade barriers in capital 
abundant economies. These studies thus suggested that tariffs are affected by 
unemployment rate and income GINI coefficient, which, in turn, could serve   16
as instruments in the 2SLS estimation. The source of these data is found on 
Appendix B.  
An instrument is “weak” if it has a low correlation with the included 
endogenous regressors. In my estimations, the t-values and the F-value in 
the first-stage regression of TSLS are significant at the conventional 
statistical level. Also, the correlations between the instruments 
(unemployment rate and income GINI coefficient) and the endogenous 
variable (weighted tariffs) are sufficiently large.7 These suggest that the 
instruments are not “weak” and the estimators are consistent (Anderson and 
Sawa, 1979; Staiger and Stock, 1997).  
The over-identification test also suggests that unemployment rate and 
income GINI coefficient are good instruments indeed. The p-value for the 
over-identification test is 0.16, which is higher than the cutoff number, 0.1, 
that was suggested by Wooldridge (2002). In other words, the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected.  
D.   Data Descriptions 
Data from the House of Representatives during the years 1982-1990 were 
used to perform my estimations for two reasons. First, the number of House 
of Representatives is larger than that of the Senate (i.e., 435 House 
Representatives versus 100 Senators in the 108th Congress). Hence, the 
obvious advantage of using a large sample data from the House of 
                                                 
7 Both instruments have small correlation with the regressand (the Democratic vote share) too.   17
Representatives is to reduce the possible multicollinearity among the 
regressors. Second, some of the vote share data before 1982 are missing, and 
thus I restricted my scope between the years 1982 and 2000. Table 1 reports 
the apportionment of the House of Representatives for the 108th Congress in 
each region. Such regions are classified using the standard of the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (henceforth referred to as BEA). 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
   The contributions share is measured as the share of money that the 
Democrats collect relative to the sum collected by both the Democrats and the 
Republicans. Following the analysis of Snyder (1990), candidates defeated in 
the primaries and the minor candidates in the general election were excluded 
in my estimations. Also, I discarded the races in which a third-party 
candidate received more than 10 percent of the vote. In other words, the 
scope was restricted to Democratic and Republican candidates who ran in the 
general election. Based on this consideration, the number of observations was 
reduced to 3666. 
Since the main objective of this paper is to consider the effect of trade policy, 
two different data sets of campaign contributions were used: aggregate 
contributions and Trade-Membership-Health contributions (henceforth 
referred to as TMH). The former measures money from all fields; while the 
latter specifies funding from trade organizations and health industrial groups, 
which is a sub-set of contributions of Political Action Committees(PACs).     18
As argued before, the effects of NTB on the Democratic vote share need to 
be addressed since the NTB is also an important trade policy proxy.  
Following the proposition of Goldberg and Maggi (2000), the coverage ratio is 
used to measure the NTB. To be more precise, the coverage ratio for industry 




nI w , where 
l
n w is the import share of product nrelative to 
total imports in the industryl, and 
l
n I is the indicator variable that equals one 
when the product nis covered by some NTB measures.  
Table 2 summarizes the basic statistics applied on my data set. These 
include the mean and standard error of change of the Democrat vote share, 
change of the contribution share and also change of the weighted tariffs at 
district level for each region over a period of two election years. The sources 
of all data used in this paper are reported in Appendix B. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
IV.  Estimation Results 
A.  Effects of Tariffs on Vote Share 
Equation (2) is estimated using fixed effects estimation and also 2SLS 
estimates, and the results are reported in Row 1 in Table 3. A parameter of 
tariffs of 1.20 implies that a 10% decrease of tariffs will lead to a fall of the 
Democratic vote share by 12.0 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Many 
control variables, congressional district and time fixed effects were included 
but not reported here to save space. The positive effect of tariffs on the   19
Democratic vote share makes sense intuitively, i.e.,  a fall of protection level 
harms the interests of the labor unions in the U.S., which, in turn, 
contributes less to the Democratic Party. Accordingly, the Democratic Party 
is unable to spend more money on the campaigns to sway the public.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
     Regional estimates are also reported in Table 3. As discussed above, a 
national-line tariff could have different impacts on different regions. To 
consider the regional difference, 50 states were separated into eight districts 
according to the classification of BEA: i.e., Far West, Rocky Mountain, Plains, 
Great Lakes, Southwest, Southeast, Mid-east and also New England.  
Most of the coefficients of tariffs are positive and statistically significant 
at conventional levels. However, there exist some exceptions. For example, 
coefficients of tariffs in the Mid-east region are negative for both the fixed 
effects and the 2SLS estimates, though they are insignificant. After 
controlling for the endogeneity problem, the coefficient of weighted tariffs in 
New England and Southeast regions are insignificant too. Simultaneously, 
the effects of campaign contributions on the Democratic vote share in these 
two regions are relatively large: 0.28 for New England and 0.34 for Southeast, 
respectively. These suggest that the voters in these regions are very 
insensitive to the trade policy. Instead, the campaign plays a major role for 
the election outcome.    20
Compared to the tariff coefficient for the whole country, the magnitudes of 
tariffs in some regions (i.e., Far West, Plains, Southwest and Rocky Mountain) 
are relatively large. These suggest that trade policy is relatively important to 
the Democratic vote share in these regions. Thus, a fall of tariffs might cause 
many blue-collar workers to lose their jobs, which, in turn would result to less 
campaign funding to the Democratic Party. As a consequence, the Democratic 
Party has a disadvantaged position in the election.  
In all the estimates presented in Table 3, the effect of campaign 
contribution to the election outcome is significantly positive. The impact of 
the Democratic campaign spending on its vote share is around 0.22. This 
effect varies from 0.14 in Far West region to 0.34 in Southwest region.  
B.  Various Robustness Checks 
In this section, I used different data sets of campaign contributions and 
trade policy proxy to perform four kinds of robustness checks. Table 4 
contains the main results. 
 First, trade policy could have different impacts on election outcomes in 
terms of incumbency status. In some districts, the electoral competition in the 
House of Representatives is between two challengers (i.e., open-seat 
competition). However, in some districts, competition happens between an 
incumbent and a challenger. Tariffs changes might matter much in elections 
that are contested. Estimate (2) in Table 4 shows the estimated results for 
open-seat districts, dropping observations with incumbent candidates.   21
Compared to Estimate (1) in Table 4, which includes both cases—open-seat 
and incumbent, the effects of trade policy on electoral outcome for open-seat 
candidates are stronger than for those with an incumbent candidate. To be 
more precise, the coefficient of tariffs is 2.11 for open-seat districts. This 
estimated coefficient is around 2 times larger than that including all districts.   
Second, Estimate (4) in Table 4 shows that the coefficient of NTB is 
1.01.This number is close to the coefficient of Tariffs, 1.20, in Estimate (1) in 
Table 3. This suggests that the effect of trade policy on electoral outcome is 
relatively stable regardless of its proxy.   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Finally, given that my interest is to see the effect of trade policy, the 
campaign funding, which comes directly from trade industry, might have a 
stronger link to the electoral outcome. Estimate (3) and (5) use funding from 
trade industry and health industry to replace the total funding. The 
coefficients of campaign contributions turned out to be smaller while those of 
trade policy are larger. Particularly, when the tariffs are used as a trade 
policy proxy, the effect of TMH contribution is smaller than the effect of total 
contributions: 0.07<0.21. Similarly, I obtained the same result even when 
using NTB as trade proxy: 0.07< 0.11. 
  Table 5 contains the 2SLS estimates results for these four kinds of 
robustness checks. Estimate (4) in Table 5 reports the coefficients of total 
contributions share and NTB, using the income GINI ratio and the   22
unemployment rate as instruments. The effect of NTB on electoral outcome is 
relatively large (4.25) compared to the corresponding fixed effects estimate 
(1.01) in Estimate (4) in Table 5.  A very similar result can be found in 
Estimate (5) in Table 5, using TMH funding to replace total funding.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
In a nutshell, in this section, various robustness checks confirmed my 
previous finding: the effect of trade policy on Democratic vote share is 
significantly positive. The coefficient of Democratic vote share with respect to 
trade policy proxy is around one unit, and it is amplified when the 
endogeneity problem is mitigated.  
V. Prediction of Electoral Outcome 
My theoretical model can also be used to predict the electoral model, 
ignoring the information of trade policy. Consider a simplified version of 
theoretical specification (1) without tariff: 
()
R D
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0                               (3). 
Treating tariff as a random variable, and only using data on Democratic 






it x ε ϕ α β β π + + + ⋅ + = 1 0                                        (4).   23
Note that the estimated marginal effect of contributions on the Democratic 
vote share, 1 ˆ β , can also be explained as the fraction of uninformed group ρ − 1 , 
which, in turn, implies that the fraction of informed group is  1 ˆ 1 β ρ − = . 
Accordingly, the portion for Democrats within the informed 
group,∫
K j j dK K f
~
0 ) ( , can be measured by  ) ˆ 1 ( ˆ
1 0 β β − . In a nutshell, there are 
two advantages to use this simple specification: first, the informed share can 
be identified; and second, the portion for Democrats within the informed 
groups can be measured as well, which are used to compare with the U.S. 
politics today.  
Row (1) in Table 6 reports the fixed effects estimation results. The 
coefficient, 34 . 0 ˆ
1 = β , measures the marginal effect of campaign contribution 
share. If the Democratic contributions share increases by 1%, then its vote 
share will increase by 0.34%, ceteris paribus. This coefficient can also be 
explained as the uninformed voters’ fraction in the U.S., using my theoretical 
framework.  In other words, the fraction of the uninformed voters is 34%; and 
then the fraction of the informed voter is 66%.  Roughly speaking, by my 
estimate, one-third of the voters are uninformed. Given the intercept 
coefficient,  36 . 0 ˆ
0 = β , which measures the vote share from the informed group, 
the percentages of voters for the Democrat Party within the informed group 
vote can be measured:  % 1 . 54 ) 34 . 0 1 /( 36 . 0 ) ˆ 1 ( ˆ
1 0 = − = − β β . Namely, more than   24
one half of informed voters vote for the Democratic Party in the country as a 
whole.  
Table 6 also contains regional estimation results. The marginal effect of 
contributions, 1 β , for each region varies from 0.26 to 0.44. Applying the same 
method above, I obtained the percentage of the Democratic supporters within 
the informed group for each state. Such percentages varied from 44% to 56%. 
Particularly, such fractions are lower than 50% for the Great Lakes, Plains 
and Rocky Mountain regions. These suggest that more informed voters in 
these three regions prefer the Republican Party. Conversely, more informed 
voters in other five regions (i.e., New England, Mid-east, Southeast, 
Southwest and Far West) are in favor of the Democratic Party. Moreover, 
56.3% of the informed voters favor the Democratic Party in the New England 
region. This confirms that the New England region is a stronghold of the 
Democratic Party.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
I also went further to examine each state’s election outcome. Figure 4A 
describes the states wherein more informed voters prefer the Republican 
Party. Clearly, Ohio favors the Republicans while Pennsylvania favors the 
Democrats, which is exactly the same as the outcome of the 2004’s 
Presidential Election in Figure 4B. One might worry that some states in the 
Southeast region, known to be traditional strongholds of the Republican 
Party, were shown to be for the Democrats instead. Remember that my   25
estimations merely considered the behaviors within the informed groups. In 
other words, although many informed voters would vote a Democrat in such 
states, the uninformed voters would vote a Republican instead. This makes 
sense by taking into account the strong organizational ability of the 
Republicans (Recall the Poll of Democrats strictly decreased after the 
Convention of the Republic Party in the 2004 Presidential Election).   
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
VI.  Conclusions 
   The aim of this paper is to investigate how trade policy affects vote 
pattern in the U.S. Earlier literature has recognized that campaign 
contributions and lobbies affects trade policy (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). 
Whether or not trade policy affects the electoral outcome still remains an 
empirical question. This is the contribution of the paper. Applying an 
amended median voter model in a Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin framework, the 
declining level of protection can translate into a falling vote share for the 
protectionist party. All estimations suggest a positive effect, using a different 
trade policy proxy. Also, the simple political model presented in this paper 
can be used to predict the election outcome.  
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Appendix  
 
Appendix A: Effect of Tariffs on the Democratic Vote Share 
Considering the effect of tariffs on people who support Democratic Party 
within the informed group: 
D
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where
) ( ) (




R D R D R D
R D
p r p r
L p T p T p w p w p CS p CS
p p K
−
− + − + −
≡ .  
Note that the F.O.C of utility’s maximization implies ) ( ) (
D D p d p S C − = ′ , 
where  ) (p S C ′  is the derivative of consumer surplus and  ) (p d  is the import 
good’s consumption. Given the tariff revenue,  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
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 we get  ) ( ) ( ) (
D D D D p m t p m p T ′ ⋅ + = ′ . Furthermore, notice that  ) (
D p d is the 
individual level of consumption of the import good, we 
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One can use the GDP function, K r L w y p y GDP
D + = + = 2 1 , to simplify (A2). 
It turns out  ) ( ) (






′ + ′ = , taking the partial derivative with 
respect to
D p , and using the Envelope theorem. Now plug it into (A2): 
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Since  ) ( ) (
D R p r p r > given that
D R p p < , the denominator is positive. 
However, without more information, we can not determine the sign of the 
nominator. If  0 /
~
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Appendix B: Data Sources 
=========================================================== 
Variables  Data Sources and Descriptions 
Democratic Vote Share  Data are directly from Federal Elections Committee via 
ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ . 
 
Campaign Contributions   Data are directly from Federal Elections Committee via 
ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/ . 
 
T/M/H Contributions  Campaign funding from trade industries and health 
industries. It is part of funding from Political Action 
Committees. 
 
Foreign Born Ratio  Ratio of persons identifying as foreign born relative to 
labor force in its district. Data from E. Scott Adler via  
http://sosci.colorado.edu/~esadler/districtdatawebsite . 
 
Race Percentage  Ratio of number of Black relative to number of 
population. Data source is the same as above. 
 
Urban Ratio  Ratio of population living in urban areas relative to the 
labor force in district. Data from various years Census. 
 
Unemployed Ratio  Ratio of persons identified as unemployed relative to the 
labor force in district, Data from various years Census. 
 
Income GINI coefficient   The state-level income GINI distribution data comes 
directly from Western-Guetzkow-Rosenfeld (2002). The 
data is calculated according to individual annual income 
level. Data can be obtained from 
http://www.princeton.edu/~joshg/inequality.htm  
 
Weighted Tariffs   Data are from Intentional Data Center at University of 
California Davis directed by Robert C. Feenstra: 
http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/ .The weighted tariffs are 
constructed via 4 steps: 
(1) obtain SIC 4-digit tariffs using the duties value 
divided by the customs value; 
(2) Aggregate SIC4-digit tariffs across countries and 
industries to obtain SIC 2-digit tariffs. 
(3) Calculate the weighted county-level tariffs, using the 
industrial structure provided by Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
(4) Harmonize the county level tariffs data and 
congressional district level data.   
 
Non-Tariff-Barriers  Data are from TRAINS by UNCTAD (various years) 
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Table 1: Congressional Apportionment in Each Region 
  Region                     States Abbreviations included 
Far West  AK(1), CA(53), HI(2),NV(3),OR(5),WA(9) 
Mid-east DE(1),MD(8),NJ(13),NY(29),PA(19) 
New England  CT(5),ME(2),MA(10),NH(2),RI(2),VT(1) 
Great Lakes  IL(19),IN(9),MI(15),OH(18),WI(8) 
Plains IA(5),  KS(4),MN(8),MO(9),NE(3),ND(1),SD(1) 




Sources: BEA website from http://www.bea.gov/. Numbers in parentheses are 




Table 2: Summary Statistics, 1982-2000 
 Change of  
Vote share  
(




D x ∆ ) 
Change of 
Weighted Tariffs 




Region  Mean  Stan. Err.  Mean Stan. Err.  Mean  Stan. Err.
Whole Country  -.002  .15  .005 .30  -.003  .01 
Southwest -.013  .17  -.017 .31  -.003  .01 
Southeast -.007  .20  .001 .32  -.003  .02 
Plains -.004  .11  .002 .25  -.003  .01 
Great Lake  -.003  .11  .007 .27  -.002  .10 
Rocky Mountain  -.001  .25  .007 .25  -.002  .008 
Mid-east -.001  .15  .004 .34  -.004  .01 
Far-west .007  .10  .019 .27  -.003  .006 
New England  .009  .17  .015 .25  -.003  .01 
 Sources: various datasets are introduced in the paper. Data are sorted by the mean 
of change of weighted vote share for each region. 
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Table 3: National and Regional Estimates  
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Notes: The regressand is the Democratic vote share. Numbers in parentheses are t 
values. Coefficients with double stars (**) and single star (*) denote significance at 
1% level and 5% level, respectively. Income GINI coefficient and unemployment rate 
were used as instruments for 2SLS estimates. The district level and year specific 
fixed effects were included. Control variables such as race, blue-collar ratio and 
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Table 4: Various Fixed Effects Estimates 
Regressand: 


















T/M/H Contribution  
Share 















District  Fixed  Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
Type of Candidates  O; I  O  O; I  O; I  O; I 
Other Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
# of Obs.  3666  426  3666  1196  1196 
Notes: numbers in parentheses are t-values. Coefficients with double stars (**) 
denote significance at 1% level. Coefficients of intercept, controllable variables and 
year-specific effects were ignored to save space. O= Open seats; I= Incumbents. 
  
Table 5: Various 2SLS Estimates  
Regressand:  

































District  Fixed  Effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  Trend  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Type of Candidates  O; I  O  O; I  O; I  O; I 
Other Control Variables  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs.  3666  426  3666  1196  1196 
Notes: numbers in parentheses are t-values. Coefficients with double stars (**) 
denote significance at 1% level. The GINI coefficient and unemployment rate were 
used as instruments. Coefficients of intercept, controllable variables, and year-specific 
effects were ignored to save space. O= Open seats; I= Incumbents.   33
 
Table 6: Prediction of Election Outcomes 
Regressors  Regressand: 
Democratic  
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Whole Country      .36** 
(71.40) 
       .34** 
(48.57) 
               54% 
 
4099



































New England  .34** 
(13.04) 
       .40** 
(10.47) 
56% 228 
Notes: numbers in parentheses are t-values. Coefficients with double stars (**) 
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Figure 1: Data Pattern for the Whole Country  

































































Democratic Vote Share Weighted Tariff Level  
Note: Data of the Democratic vote share are from Federal Elections Committee. 




Figure 2: Different Weighted District Tariffs 














































































































Notes: top-left and top-right panels are weighted district tariffs in Alaska and 
Massachusetts, respectively. Bottom-left and bottom-right panels are weighted 
district tariffs in district 8 (Bay area) and district 51 (Imperial county) in California, 
respectively.   35
 
 
Figure 3: Change of Democratic Vote Share and Weighted Tariffs 
Change of Democratic Vote share vs. Change of Weighed Tariffs



































Notes: the simple OLS regression suggests that 10% change of tariffs increased to 
13.7% change of the Democratic vote share. The tariffs coefficient is significant at 




Figure 4: Comparison between Estimation and Political Reality 
Figure 4A: Estimate Results 
 
Figure 4B: Presidential Elections (2004) 
Note: States in dark color in Figure 4A denote that the Republican Party has a 
majority supporter within the informed group. Similarly, States in dark color in 
Figure 4B denote those states were pro-Republican Party in the 2004 Presidential 
Election. The data in Figure 4B were taken from the webpage of the Federal 
Election Committee.  